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VillAge leaders in the Chinese reform economy are as-sumed to
maximize a multiple-attribute utility function; their behavior is
modeled in a dynamic control framework. Using village data, structural
and control equations for industrial output, grain yields, capital, non-
farm employment and hybrid rice are estimated. Results confirm
hypotheses that village l~aders are preoccupied wi~h rural
in4us,tr~aliza:tionbut are al~o cone-erned a~>out m,aint>a'tnihg h.igh-
agri,cultural prod:uctiyity to meet gr.at-n obligations.Control in a Dynamic Economy: >> >
Modeling the Behavior of the Chinese Village Leader
Introduction
Economic reform in China has changed the face of the rural economy.
stimulating both rapid growth in agriculture an~ a broad~ning of the sco.p~ of
economic activity. Grain ~>roduc~>~;on.,rose at a~~ost 5% per year from 1979
through 1984; the value of gross s;grtcultural product (GAP) increa~ed at an
> _ > ,,~~ r > ~ ~= :. ~ ~
1970's I tUr~l i.ndustrial 'output was l~ss th~n to\ 6:f gro.srs rural product. 11;:
~ > ~ A
eve.n gr'~:~tter annuS:l rat;~. 8%, (ZGNYNJ, ,1 ~~O - .1'9,aS).
, ,
Grow·th in the rural
now constitutes over half the economic activity of rural areas (ZGNCNJ, 1988).
The expansion of agricultural output d~ring t~is period was due in part
, "
to the adop'tion of agricultural technology, chang-es in pricing policies a~d
input supply, and, most importantly, due to major institutional adjus,tments
agriculture, the incentive system was redesigned' to enco'ura~e rural p,~.oP1e to
diversify agricultural, p+oduct<~on a~d expand rural industrial activities,
In the past several years, however, growth in parts of the rural sector
has slowed. Grain pr:oquctfon ha.s never re~eovered to the record levels of
1984. Between 1985 and 1988 the growth in GAP continued, but at only half the
annual rate of the first half of the decade. ~ig?·level administrators blame
the faltering in the rural economy on the inability to effectively implement
policies at the l-ocal level (Oi, 1988). Leaders do not have experience ip.
> -'~:;~. ~~~
dealing with the contradictions implicit in a dualistic system (i.e"
administrative and market). Moreover, there is no model with which policy
1makers can analyze the ne,w relationships' that have been established between
~ > ~ - A'
the village leaders and farmers, the fundamental economic actors in rural
areas (Nee and Young, 1989; Shue, 1989).
Chinese and Western economists have addressed this emerging problem of
. ,
control. Johnson (1989j', Sicu'lar (1988) f Stone (19-88) f Su (1989) f Taylor
(198'8r<~n"d Li~f Yac( and Y~n (198'9) point to many unintended consequences "~f
new pricing poli~ies and eJtpert~ents in markets 'tor 'fertilizer, labor and
·.land..
.':.sci~>rtc:e ':~:hd teehnolbgy ~ystem t:~ "the' rei:~rJ1l~. 'rhes~ ,~tudi~s:., hQ~e'v~p "
: y / - ~ ( ,.
"
ba:ta lim:itatlons' a'~d restricted -acc~ss to rural areas have precluded any
previous 'e'f.forts to provide a multi-dimensional model which could be used to
-- .
The' 'purpose ·:~t this paper is" to p:r,ovide a comprehensive, integrated
framework to 'analyze the heha:vior·'of village leaders and farmers in China's
assumed to maximize a m\11ti-attribute u:tility func:~ion sUbject to certain
~, ~.
structural and endowment constraints and only limited control over the
r-e~ortn, ..e;~,ono1riy,. "A ~ynam~c C:>.ptl~~r corrt::rol model ~~il be .tfs~d to :d~sct"ihe and
quan'tif'y "th~ >relati6~ships among the economi~ actors. Village leaders are
The ·theore'tical lnodel is estimated empi.ric.ally'using a behavior of ';rmers.
unIque 'set of pooled time-series, cross-section village data collected during
15 months of fleld'work in Central China.
The Viltage'Deci$ion 'F:r'anfewo,;k
Although villag~" ie~der-s face administrative restrictions from higher
levels of government, extensive personal interviews clearly revealed that
2far the most important role of village leaders in the 1980's is as economic
managers. As seen in figure ~ I . they ~;re·'·responsible f;Qr operati.ons to varying
degrees in both agricu~ture and villag~ indu$t:ri~s,. Village leaders make
decisions to achieve their goals subject to ra,c-tor endowment limitations and
rigidities cau$8d by the structure of the economy. They have substantial, but
not co~pletet ~ontrol over farmers' pr~~uctiondecisions ·and labor allocation.
Thus. to accomplish village obJectives. villa~e leaders must work to affect
th;e. b~~avior of -f~r:~e.rs ~:?ir::e:ct-lY._~rindit.'e.c~ly-. a~d':~;~te:mPt::>~o, ari.tici;,p~t;:e-'
fax·mer '-re~;p~nse 'to 'policy ¢harig~s and "e,e~npnll'~:-con'di:t:io:l1s th' _etn~'rging ma:d.tets.
> , ~> ~ ~~ ~ , ~>: > ~ ~ i ~ _ >
many prodqction decisi.ons. In the allocation of land they make both long-term
allocations of land among villag~ households and ye~rly crop and varietal
seJection decisions,. :Fa,rmers-, -on the other :hand, are' primarily responsible
fOlf allocating labo;r betwee.n agricultural enterprises -and non-farmecon'omic
~ :.~?:~< ~-,
~:Ut:t-he:rm~re: .•,_'-m9st curr~~t .ipputs (e .g'.,. f.e~tittiz::e:r:, fa~ -
v > , > > > , > ,•• , ~ ~ • .' / > ~ .,Y
chemica'fs', seed, plastic ~heeting, fuels:. e~c.) must be purchased .and applied
by -the farmer using the farmer's own operatingcapital.
Village leaders t however I can itifluerfc:e both labor and current-input
usage di:.t;:ectly .!ind indirectly. TQ;ey can re.quire farmers to- pe::rf_~rm_ u;p to 15
days of free "obligation" labor per year • - to be used no-t only to maintain
agricultural infrastructure, but also for other activities such as building
structures to be used for village industries. They can also establish rules
involving minimum levels of ap:plication of certain inputs or a.-ffect:
application levels by providing inputs at subsidized prices. Some leade-rs


























4spend a great deal ·of time finding ~x:d procul:"ing inputs th.;i.t are in cr,itical1y
~ / ~; <> '~
shori":~uppiy; and' t-r-ansp'o~ttni back to the village.
v ~ ~ > '_ ,
One of the mos'i: effective tools that vill-age leaders use to control
their Ideal' eeononlies is agricultural technology. In particular, each year
l£aders must decide what proportions of their fields are to be sown with
hybrid 'r'1.ce, 'conventional rice varieties and other cash crops. Hybrid rice
varieties,while high~tyielding, require more labor,. fertilizer and
~ ~ .- ~ >~ ~~ ~
insecticIdes, as well as better water control and overall,management. There
"
is ,& ti<i:ai~~ (if £~rme:r~ wh.o ,WQUld ':t:ather ',no,t ctiltlvat: 'a 'rice crop that re9u'ires
> ~-
between' 'hybrid:s">~nd c;onv-entional lIlo,dern varietLes.
Despite their substantial power, village leaders must operate within
administrative restrici'tions, the most important of which is a marketed surplus,
contract through which 'they commit the village to supply certain amounts of
grain', oilseed and fiber product to the state marketing system. The prices
for !:hese: '.p,r~d~ets a,re low t ~:~pec:~ally relativfi!, to the ~ree nia;l"~~t price,s that
, ,
exist for s'(jme crops. In return, villages receive an allocation of nitrogen
fertilizs'r, diesel fuel and credit at subsidized pric.es. wt:en coupled wi~~
'rt;-strict1.ons theft discourage or prohibit grain sales back to villages, these
"obligation'" levels of pro~uction can be very hi~h and are often a re·al burden
to the' village.
The emphasis on rural industry intensifies the competing < demand,S f~r
scarce village resources. Village fields are often diverted from "()bligatlon"
crops to higb-er value cash crops to be used by rural industry directly as
inputs or as a source of investment capital. This places a premium on
5Although the 'agricultural sector is an indispensable part of
- ~ ~ A < / - ~ ~ - >
increasing yields on there'~~intng grliin land &~d highlii.hts the impo~Jl~nt
linkagas between the two lIlajor $ectors o.f th.e rural e:¢ot:\o~y.
~t~a~st~y':
< -, ~
~ ~ - > < - ~
the village community, it is easy to understand why village lead~r~ have
> ,
fo'cused <>n rural industry for village dev-elopmen-t. Rur~l i~d~stries g~nerally
-- - / --, ~ , ~
opera,te under fewer administrative r~strictlons frQ~ _~i~he,~ ,lev~ls of
governm-ent~ How:ever t there- can still be subst-antial imp'e:d~~ents t~ j.ndustrial
gr()~tt{>" ,F~f j~~liy .t:~dti:~:t:r'ie~1 .1oca:t-i;ij8.'-a~-dJ;ria~nt~lntng 'Fay! mat~:ri~~ s~pp,l:i~s
~> - " :,:-: .,: > <;<~ ~ > A _ > > : > ~ __ ,~
,~-~~' 'th~ :mg~i:".f~~qtt~~tlY:.eil~~~~~~r~d. __~,~~ .::~:~rio~~ .~pe:r~t!~t1~:l __p:rob~,~m~ ':, ., :In, the
A _' ~ / ~ ~ • ,
early' ,ye:a,rsQ:f :pp:e'r~t:i~t1~' a, 'new ind,u$tr~ o:fteTt _ de:pen~s onits own ·vill~g'e' s
agricultural resourc:es fot· some portio~ of the r-e-quired raw materials Ot' as a
sour6~ oi cap{tal~
> - ~ >. ,'-
Thus, agricultural restrictions and quota burdens
indirectly i~pinge on industrial behavior.
Furthermore, factor markets for labor and-capital for industry, are also
s<er~ous'~y l:~:Blite:d: The lack of ·21 labo:rmarkat 'has made vill~~~: l~a~~r~
'L6~ns are
rationed by ~igher-ievel adminis~rators. Thes~ loans are formall~ granted
, ,
~ither- as $eed capita.l fo~ new facto~ie:s, or for' covering sh~rt-.~e~rm
ope.rational needs.. Village .lead?rs unde~sta:nd the fungibil:ity of these.cash
infusions and admit that scarce capital IS often used to meet both fixed af<kd
operating capital require-ments.
I'n the" Ab~en:ce of grants from official channels, capital is ofte~
,.
limited' by"sources of 'v'illage funds. Major sources of funds ar.e: (I)
inV"estm~ni'by' farm fa~{iies 'of the'same village; (2) fun~s coaxed from private
entrepreneurs with'{n the village and (3) the retained earnings of the existing
enterprises. Village leaders claim that the accumulation of capital funds for
6,both, f~~·t~~.,~xpa~~,~~,~~d ;~~r t~~ __:4~~,~.f~~~Y ,~~~;~a~:~_~~~ ,~:s ~rye b~;~~~~_t
difficu~~y.in r~n~ng ~ vill~ge enterprise. Anot~er s~ur~~.of ,non-~a~h
< ~:' o. ~ A :~: A', / ": ~~ > " ',,' ,l < - - •• -'~~ ~~»> N ~'_" i A ~~ : ~ , >. > >, ~" A~ >'
perform other tasks that will f.o;ster industrial ,dev~lgp~ent.
• ~ ~ ~ > ~~ > v" " > ~ i~ " ~ - < -
V111~~~ ~bje.c~.~ves: _ ~~r~i~~,~!. >:~1) r~~_~~~:s~_ to: t~,e ,.,,~~~.titU~i~;n~! ,~hq.nges"
village leaders clearly.hav:~,8 n~bt?r o~;po~e~t.iallycompE?ttng objec~ive$.
~ > ~ > ,. ~ > ~ ~ ;",' :: ~ > ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~~ ~ / ~ ~ • > " ~.
They are motivated by both political and e-conomic forces which 'further.. ,t~eir
in;t~l;:;es.t$. Th~se: Jl1:o:t~~q.:t::iQns m~an tb;~,t villagfi!! l~a4~:r$ ..4re d9i~g, more ..t;h~n
~~> > V>'>~~' ~_" ~" ~-<~<: ~ i > '"', ,', _ > N<: ~ ~ v,< ',~. ~~ ~. ~ ~: .": ·i·~ >~ A ~ > > o~,·. > > ~ ,.'.,.' ~ ~~ ~~<·~~~'A~i ~ > ~ ;~~. ~ ~', ' ~ ,'.' 'l' ~ ,.. ~. ./'.• ~ -
ttyitr~ to ·nra!'timize p:roftt-s. 'In .~oine ,c~rt::~$ta'P:(i:~:$ :v-.iliai~ :lea4~rs 4<> .m:~k~
~,. ~ ~ _ /:~ ~ ~ ~ >~.;i·: _.. > ~ ~ _~'.~~ ~~.~ .:. : ~ .,~ -. ~ > ~ ~ , _.; • ~ ~.
- ,
There, ~~e ~any sit~~ti0ns •. ,h~~~ve~'f ~~e:r~ :~~:llage ~~~4ers' ar,¢ ~aking de,eis~9~~
which would seem irration~l un~~r the assumPtions of Rrofit ma~imizatiQnt but
which are lo~ie,al,a~d ~ons,isten,t when vie~.ad as, ~~:ti9?S taken by indivi4':l-~ls
who are maximizing.8 more co~plicatedt mu1t.iple-a.t;tX:,ibute util~ty ,f,u.t:lction.
'!.hese ,goa.ls a~~. ;p:ursued ,through m~asures _that 4re t;~ken ,to shape the
achieving high agricultural productivity in grain production will boost the
status,of a village l~.ade-r and C8·n provide opportun,i:ties for lea·de.rs ,to be
promoted into the stat;e 'agricultu:~al hie,~archy. Raising ~rain y.ields,
however, r:e,quires re~:crurces ap4 'coul-o. ¢:opfTi-ct wi,t.b ,e(forts to ac:cumulate
capital and ~obilize la~or for investment in ~ill~ge,ind~stri~s. Leaderp.
perceiye industri~liz~tio,n,~s a way to, in!;:rease. ,~~:~Jr, .p~\o!eJ;' i,n ~th~ yillage anq:,
as a means t.o supplement their own incomes.
>~. , / - > >' ~. ,
The l~vels ~{,grain yiel-cl:~ t~emselre,~,are o-bJ-eetives to be pu~sued by
Village leaders; the same is true for hybrid rice adoption. Most village
leaders know the level of a~~ption of hybrid rice for most every other village
7in the 'to~~hi~-: '~The :-'''iita"~fi "ie.;l:~ers ~:rtbin "th~',to-Jrisb:lp who are tderifiited
as th~ "be~t'" a:gridtiltutal /leadei'~ invariably 'ha'V~'I)oth the"high~:st yields ~nd
tbe':>lii:ghe~t;-t~~et oi":h;yht;1d ad~ption. ,', r~~thei:~~t~:""th~Y ~~if th~t»ihe~'~' is
~~~ ~ ~;-i~>,1
frequently pressure applied' by 'tbWt1ship and c'~ti.ti'ty l~aders for' l.ncreasit1'g the
levei>6t'hyb:tid':tf~e''adoption:-- ' T:o:Wnshtp l~ad:~~s".Jiew high' "i~ie's o'f "hybrld
agridyjii:'tir~~:: :
"'}('~O:iEi"l~JifP~~:t'e :dfs:t:u~{~~to:n Qf go.ai~ '~ri~ 6bj·~'~'~t-ve's:,:\)i" ~i:~i'age" c:t):die'~ 'is'"
,. -re:f.'dr:t~d'<~t~ewh~~t~', tR~z'e'l,:r~/ ':~9'8'~):.. :',"bri· >;~lie' >ba:~:i!:i >¢f 'eit!en:$iV'~ irit~f\riew~,
,w~~h:,v~if~:i~ ·:l~:~~~:r's' ~» '~h~' ~Qst i~p6~tatit' :g~:als ar,~' r>~i'~t~d 1:0: ,pt()tno~ipn"
personal'p'f'o£it', "~tit't:,is;: po~et', job 'sec~tt't1>, 'rtldep~'ndence 'ari(('th~ "~ftn.ii~:tic
cOrnniitment'to their const'ituen'ts. There 'also 'seems t~ \~e g~neral agreement
that '-th~e.s'e g6,ils are'pursued 'through :th'e; fol'l'o",ing' e~()nomfc '~~asure's:
industrial p'ro-fits, grain yi'elds..inve'st:ment ::fn .Jil1ag~ enterprises t non-fa;m
employment opportunities and technol~glcal progress in a~r;~ctilture, not all of
which are' ':-afforded/"tbe s-ame'level of'itnp6rta:n6~.
The Mo-d:el,and ,bpitigal Spe:cittcat~on
The Thetir'etieal Hodel: The above characterization of' the goats and
objective:~''o;f Village leaders is'"co=ns'ts:terlt ~i'th the' c~tfc'ep:tual '~pp'roa:cli
populari!i:ed>b:y Kirshen arid 'Morti:sens '>'(1973) t i~ which goals: of leade'r~'"are
achieved "thr:bugh' a set of'economic Irieasur~s/. To q-uantify the importance of
~. >' ( > ~
the set of economic measures or objectives t and to further \:l:nderstand the
behavior 6"f r\iral' econolnld ai~nts t <th{s:' ~~c>Eid~> outlines a m'6del consi.:stent
with thi's approach'. Stated differe'ntly, village leaders a're assumed to be
maximizIng a multi-dimensional objective function over time by 'controlling the
8processes in the r~r~lep~n~my a~f'ecting,:-the,' yariables. wh-ich 'c-ontribute to"
utility. It is proposed'that the behavior of the village leaders can be
described by a dynamic'optimal,~9ntrol model (Bertsekas, 1976). 'In matrix




pt, '_ a dtsC:Qun-t, ,.rate;'
nand Wt matrices of weights;
Xt a. ye-ctor of <state variables;'
Ut a vector of control variables;
£t a vector ,of error <,terms; and
At C and b matrices of structural parameters.
By assuming that the functional form of the objective function is quadratic,
and ,thattbe: structural constraints are' linear" when eq:uatio-r(,(l) is mfil:ximized
subject to equation (2), the optimal levels of the control variables are
line-ar functions of the lagg-ed state variables:
(3)
where G and g, the behavioral coeffi'cients, are functions of the parameters of
(1) and (2).
The Empirical Sp:ec-ificat:ion: The specifications of 'equations ('1)' 'and
(2) used in the application. ()f ttte model to village leaders: :1n C~n:t'ral China
are given in table I, along 'wi,tn the 'definitions of the v:a:r-iables.. The
villa:ge environment is described by the set of nine structural equations for
industrial profits, grain yields, capital, investment, non-agricultural labor,
9(4) ,1t1s,'.X: ,E:(V),
subject ,to:
(5) tt~ - ,~p + ~lrt.
(6) G~ ==~ ~ /);0: +, ~ibt
fl) K t - ::Kt.':'l"~ ;it.
"
{S}- it ..' ~:o.::,-+ 81~~
(9) 4.
(11) Pt
(12), ',J?t' >- -pro ,+ #1:0£-1 ,+ ~7t







G t """ grain yietas
~ - ,capttal in
rural industries
it. - i~vestment in capital
":plan~: ,'::'
h t ..... proportion hybrid rice area
10~rbrid rie,e a;rea J p:rices. the grain obligati~n and 'loans in the Chinese
into (7) for e$tim~t.ion. Of the re:mairrirtg elght equations, the first five c~n
> I __ > ~ --
'V"illage. Sin~e equation (7) is an identity, equation (8.) can be substituted
~ ~ _~, ~v~-i~.
> ~ > "
be considered rtendoge:nous" both because the state variables of these .equatiot).s
appear in the objective function~ and because actions taken in the ~ocal
economy affect their levels. The following disc~ssion t:>riefly reyie~.s the




the leve·l of ind4~rtria.1 o~.tptit (rb) -and, ci:~pi~ai {l(t.,..l.)
< / " > • ~ ,. ~ ~" - ~~, '" ~ A :~ ~>
associated with investment (it), the addition to the current capital base
should be expected to add to current profitability. The wage rate of the
village industrial s:ector (wt ) is included it.t the equation be-cause village
leaders have monopsonistic power in setting wages; its sign in the equation
sh,?Uld be ,·negative -b~~~u~e .~s ,wa~e rat~~_ in~rea~~e..;-: 1.~:s·s -of- th~ ear'tl:i~gs a~e
retained by the vi.llage as profits. Since fleXibility in deci~i£?n making is
greater in the industrial sector than it 15 in ligri:cttl~uz:~, it is re~~onable
to expect that some measure of industrial prices rela.t.ive to agricultural
, ,.
prics:s (Pt - 1) woulp, be ,positively, rela<te~d to industrial p:rofits.
A >.A '
In equation (6), village leaders are byp:othesiz.ed to influence gr~in
yields by varietal selection and by the ~110'cation of subsidiz~d.. inp~ts. By
choosing a higher pro.portion of the grain area to be s:own to hy?rid:,rice (~t)J
the new highe.r-yieJding, agricultural techn~logy, g:~:ain y.ields w~ul.d be
expected to increas,e. Similarly, when l~a:ders increase the amount of nitrogen
fertilizer (ft,.) available to Village farmers, at least part of the additional
11, "
increment would be expected to be applied to grain crops. However, if the
area soWn to cash crops (ct ) is increased, re.sourcas can be expected .to be
, »
diverted to th'e;se crops away from grain, with an ad'\Terse effect on grain
yields. Finally, both village leaders and farmers can be expected to adjust
grain yields in response to changes in the price of agricultural goods
relative't'o that of industrial products (Pt - 1). But the direction of the
change'ln the i'o'c~i Chi~es,e 'econ~~y 'is ambiguous. Left on their own, farmers
.,~ ,
de~r:~.~s~ i'ri;', P:'... ~).. "With ':t;fsing indu~~rialprie'~s, no,wever, v~lI-age leaders'
$igh~,:'b~:"-i:n6tltj~ato push for hi:~he~'»gr,ainyields to be (ible to devot,s ev~n
, "
more land resources 'to 'cash crops that may be a supply of additional raw
materials for their factories.
After'substittii:ing equation (8) into equation (7), capital become,s a
function o:t wages, lagged profits 1a,ggad non-agricultura1 labor, lagged
, , ,
prices....and lo'ans obtai~e:d from financial institu~i.,ons, the principal
conttibt+tcrt-$ to'tbe' ~urrent s:toek ,of capi,tal. Loans, (Bt,) should be expe,cted
to he an important p.osittve factor in the increases to capital stock. The
, ,
sign 'on' the coerfictent of the wage variable (Wt ) , howev.er) is ambiguous. On
the one hand, the wage variable is included since higher wages may increase
the potential f(jr vllLsge leade:rs to encourage employee inve.stm~nt in local
industry: an the other hand, higher wages also reduce retained earnings
available for future investment from village resources. The signs on the
lagged profit 'and price variables are similarly indeterminate. Higher profits
earnings and facilitate investment in the current year. When strong markets
for industrial goods lead to increased profits and prices, however, the demand
12short economy to postl?one fixed inves!=tnent. Fin~lly,. lab9,r in the previ9us,
~- ~>.,. -:~><:-<./~
year (Lt;..-l) is included because some proportion of n9n-agri,cultural .1abp:r: i~,
~ ~ > ~~ ~ ~ v _ ~ >v ., ~- y. _" ,/ ~ _
often cotnmitted to constructing physical plant, whic~ be,c~~es pa~t of, ~he
capital stock in the subsequent year. Total no~- agr_~cul~¥ra~ e~ploytD:ent is,
> > > ~ ~~, - ,> • _ v _ > ~ -
used because the proportion of labor devoted to ~apita1 construction is not
available in the data.
E9.uati0'f:' "(~),, ~he non,~agric~1~11t;41 lab9~, ~quation:~ r:~f.le~,;~~, t;he ::':
al1ocatio~"o,f",tbe :villa:~ lahar ~tipply b~t\o1~e~,:,tht? no:n:-~:g~ic~~~J.;u~al 'a:n;d
~ , > ~ ~~ :. A V" v > > ~
Indu$,t.rial activi,ty (rt ) would be expected ~'o incre~se
< ;.> ~ < - ••v' Vv ~ >~ ~v~ ~ - > ~ • " • ~ - v -~ - ~
the flow- of l'abor, 1;ntothe:non-agricultural s~ct.o:r. ~i,ke'Wise, the
coefficients of the wage variable (we) and the price index (Pt - 1) should both
be positive. since higher off·farm wages should pull farmers out of
agriculture and lower agricultural prices, ceteJ;is parib~s, should push them
into the non-farm se'ctor. The adoption of new, rice technolo~y (ht ) , which
in6:I:~as~s the:: ~~t;utns 'to cropping ,ac:ti,vtti~s, ~o\\1:e'V:erJ ~o~ld ste~ the _ fl~w ,of
.' ~ ••A~~ ~ ~ Ai ~:. ~ A ,.. ~ > A ~ l > , > .~ • ~, ~ ~ -
labor into the ,non-agricultural sector. For a given level ~f industrial
sign if labor and capital are substitutes. Only the' coefficient on the
one hand, the higher minimum grain constraint means that the hq~s~hold must
devote more resources to agr,i~~lture. On the pthe~ ~~~d,_ as ~~e q1J~ta
increases I and farmers are requi.red to sell more ,g,~a_in_ at,~ b,elow ma:r~~t
price, agricultural households have an incentive t.q ~upply more labor t.o,the
non-farm sector.
13~~h~tio~" (10) '~~pl~tns:the adoption rate of new ~g~i~uitural tech~olog;.'
Village leaders s~t the" prO-portion of, .g:r~in area sown to hybrid ri~e at the
begtn~iIig'o'f :a~ cr·opp1.ng: '~ycl~ ;by '~b~~~i~g'~h,~'>' grain yields (Gt - I ) 'and'labor
~ ~ .-
availaoili'ty --r4~1)' during the previous ye~r. Leaders might be expecte·d to
respond to':10k":'agriciJ.'iiJral,irields in the previous period by increasing hybrid
, > Y ~ -
Conversely, high levels of employment in the
n6n-agricultura1 sector are likely to w.Qrk agait1~t the adoption of hybrid
rice.'" W}l¢:ri ~~~a'¢:~d' wi,th h:~,ghei" '~Ji';~:~; :~b,iig~:t.rG~~'·'f~~ ,gra:in (O~-lj J village
'1ead~rs fut~hk':i~,:' e1tp:~cf~~i to',fUlfil:!.at' l~as:;t'part"':~f:,':t:hi$ ,addi'~ie~al,
A ~, >~ ~ >
req~fi~m~rtt"by'in4:r'e:asing. the, ~ro:por:t:~~it at ,area, ~o~',to high~r Yie~dtng
hybri.o rice varieties. 'Finally, 'labor 'intensive cash crops (ct,) would also be
, '
expect~d' to exert pressure on village 'leaders to move into less labor
intensive ric~ -\tari-~tie~:
:' Eq:ti~trons (11) through (13) are the equations o.f motions in the economy
f.or the' price., tota:lobli,gation and loan variables; ',they ~re incl\1ded for
co~letenEi:~,s.c,'tt is cissumed th~t these'variables are gener~ted th~ough
processes d~termined by factors exogenous to the village. At this point the
intere'st: >is cent'~red mainly "on how these vaifabl-es affe~ct the five other state
variables.
contains thre:e "sets of parameters to be estimated--the parameters of 'the
structural equations (A and d), the 'paraineteis of th:e control equations (G),
and the ob}e6:tf.ve 'functfori''c'6efficients "(OJ. Thes,e parameters. however. are
not itid~p:erid~rit (F"~tton :~nd Karp' I '198:~i). I~tuftiv';ly I if any two sets are
known, the third set should be recoverable. In the most typical application
of the quadratic-linear control problem, the weights of the objective function
14of the control equations are de·rived throu.gh alg~br~'ic n:tani.pula~ion ..
In this application, it is diff~cult eve:n, t:o guess at the rela·tive
magnitudes of the weights of the different variables in the objective f~:nqti9n
of the u~ility .. f\lnction ,of the ,,~i;~.lage leader. >;Following..Chow, (19~1) and
- ~ ~. "< ~ A "
Fulton and Karp (198~), ,the over,all.;stra.tegy ..of thi~ re,se.al:cb ,i:5 to estimate
> • ~ _ ~ ~ ,.:-- A " .' ~> < • < ~ > A _ Y ~ ~ ~
the parame~.ers ,of tl)~. struc~~~~l,,~nd:; .c·o~tr~* .~q~.a~J:o!1.~: .. di.r~c,tly J >.a-nd ,tqen" .u:se
• • ~ • > N~ " -. _ ~ _ ~ _ > > • v
This, p'~pe}:- fpc~,~~s,:o.n-ly ~p .~:~:~tin~;~:~n:g" .~he> f:i~~:~. 't~cs ,~~,t:s" o:f:','p:~~,a.nl:~<t;~r$ ',' ,
: ." A,. • .~. v > • .' : N ~"- > .,/. > > ,._" -,: > A_. ~',>
> ,'>
Ph,~:~. ~e~e9-r~:~ ,Wh~c1}:--,~~., Y:'~:~ ·~9·,b~·=¢Qtn:p1ta:;ed f ,.
In the structural ~quations all but one of the right-.hand· $id~ :variables
ar.e exo~~n0':ls or lagged ~n~o~~no;u~:vari;:a,:bles. To .accoupt f():r st~,t,istical
prob,lerns arising frqm Pfivirig; the hybrid rice variable ~n the right-hand 'side,'
predicted values of, hybrid rj.ce sown area from an O~.~~nary L~ast Squares (OLSi
esti~~a;~:e'of )ittuatt,~:rL(10) w:e:r~ u:s:ed .~s inst:~tUnen't~· in e,qua.~ions (~)-' ~n:d (-9)'.
->' < - ~ ~ - ,
T'o ptck up (lifferenc~s in the depe.npe~t variabl~s.,be~ween vi-ll~g?s. ~hat mlght
arise from 1;1nob~erv:a;1?.1~ facto~s! th~ ,sy~t~.tn,of eq!-1ations was e:stim,a,te~i.w:ith
dummy variables for each of the villages.
~ro~. eq~~t'ion (3) there are ~i~, 'c;~n~r:.ol .eq\:la~i()ns to be 'e$,t~mate-d in
this applicatiqn. ~ach c,ontrQ1. v~riable is a.£unc·t.ion 'of all bu,t One of the
state .v,~r:~al:?lest ~a~g~d Q~e. per:f,.o(i. HY1?rid ric~ i~Lnot ia~ludt?«;i {is· an·
ind~pet?-~etlt variallle in the contr'ol e9~~t:!o,ns, slfl~~ t 1: 4.i~· '~ot appea-r in a'
equatio:ns. J Gt are also ,~st imate:d ,by OLS with vi.llag~ dummies in each equation
to account for inter-village difference.s in the management decision making
15.p:rocess ehat:Jtiight arise Ctue'-<i:ci 'ci:lfferences ift'vlIIage..spe:-cif1c -fact-ors and'
different manAgement abilities.
the,·authd:r dtiri:ng'-lS::mortths of field·vork in Cen:trar"China w-ere us'~d iil
es>t:i:matfng .'the model.,:' Th-_e dat-a >1nclude:d ittf«irttkiefon' on ag~iet1lturat
pro4\ict:t-Q.I1,~ >:il1V:~~tim~,n:~-~ ,lion· ~aci' :a~tivlti,e:s ',~red~~, 'p,ri;ce~ :arid te~hn~iogy
adt>p'ti~~::'- :~ttb:e:--:d~t:;a '-C-~B1~:,--~r~tlt~'rity, f-rt)n{::;t~~~~id~f k-e:pt ::p;y "th~:'adcc>hktalit in each'
'V:i;,llag~, ,¥~d::JrQ,m:aJ~:q:oun:t i~-~oks ::~lid"ife,cords >:~e:p-~, 'by th'~: tteasur~:~ in e.;;{ch
village:"t'tJn fa(::tory-. Supple:me,tltary :data \i'~:i:'e ::~ec>o~¢te&froro 'see:ond;3rysourd:es
at the ,township level.
nata' :were collected' from 40 "lfltLa&~s chos~n'-rktriiiomly' 'from more than 100
viLLages '-in- thre-e· townsliip's of .:Jiang:su'province .'"' This province. located on
the ,lowe:r:,reaches 'of ,the Yangtze -RiiTer'Valley. is- -in a densely poptilated
reg~-~n-_t ,:~hich,has'a"well d&v~:ibp'ed"a:g-r;ic'~~tural''itlfrastruct~reatta' a ,:r:ap'l-dly
devaltrping" rural 1nd-ustriCll" bas'e.. The- vtlfages-are located in northern
Yangzhou -prefecture "and'- were, selected to be :in the saIne ,agrh-climatic
environme.nt.
The v'ill'ages are in a 'regio>n whtih' is:"stili pre-domInantly agricultural,
has 'a:'hi-gh:proportion af I'and s'o~ to grain~~nd h-as it m>i~ture of new and
conventio-nal' lllode-rn' r'ice varieties . The"average -income 0f 'ruralices:f.dents in
the villages, 1-s'slightH,y belaw 'the averAge' of -the pro:vlnce,but significantly
higher than the avera,ge for itll of 'rural"dhtna~,Th~ vilLages, ho~ever, have
higher per capita agricultural output and market'i'ng iat~-s than the provincial
average. These facts reflect the historic importance of agriculture in the
16among the highest in the p;rovtnee' (JSTJ'JJNJ', 1,98'8). ,.Sti.Iniilary 'statrs'tics for
die '-ti'~st ,an~ last r~'.ir:~;,t?f,,'the time series ~r~ ..reP:o~>ted in table 2.
Industrial prices wer~' typic~lly those whicn were actually faced by the
leaders In each of the villages the'ms,elves. In the event"prices were ·not
reporte~ by the village.t then the_y", were recovere;d' by a v~r,iety of methods;
includ-ing (1) creating prices by .dividing facto,ry output into g;ross ·rf;yeT;1~,e:;
(2) usin~, prices fro_m t~e ~eares~,: v~llage with a "f~~,tory',;l:t't:' ~he same, ,:", ,',
trtdus.t-ti'al category; ()r (~) Using,::p,ri:~e.s from the to-Wn~;hip ,f'$ct6·ry :~n t:he s~ant~
~nduStri~l c-ategory. VL~lag~ tig~icultural prices.were a~>sumed "~<> Q:~ ,,~d~:ntical>
with;i:n t()Wtl$:h~ips, but varie:d over time and be-tweenthe th:r:e:etQwnships.
Commodity prices for the six major grain and cash crops were aggregat_&d into a
single agricultural price inde:)t. All prices were deflated by an index
constructed from county~level prod~cer data.
The' estimat.ed coefficients (except for the village dwnmy variables) for
the stru;ctural and con;r.ol equat~ons are in tables 3 and 4) respectd:.vely
(table 4 appears later in this section). These results are somewhat
preliminary ana will be ,refined a·s -the senior author's the$is res·earch
progresses. However, for the most part, these parameter estimates are
reasonable and are of the expected sign.
The Stru~tural Equations: From the village leader's standpoint the
structural equations are perha,ps the most important. They relate.:th$ ;
variable,s over which leaders have some control to the important eco.nomic'"





































































Bt Lo,ans (Yuan) 2500 7000 2000 - 20
Constant '1980 Yuan: 1 Yuan - $'3.71 :uS; l,Itlu'-1/6' acre" 1/15 hectare;
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.generally supP,ort t~e or:i.ginal hyp:othes-es, each o:f the coefficients has the
expected sign ~nd, except for the wage variable, the standard (1e~iation of
each coefficient is sm~11.'.relative::::to, th~ ~gnitude of the coefficl.ent.
Increases in" industrial output and"the village industry's fixed capital both
lead to higher profits. as eX.petted.., If'·there/is a cost tb inye~tmefnt) the
increase in profits due to the expansion of the capital base of village
enterprise mrir~ than offsets it" Al~() ~ as ind~strial prices r~s~ .~elative to
a"g.ricul.tq:~al:p~ices~,,\7,illa~-eindus·tries do become Ut().l7e pr9"~it:ai>l~".
C'o-ri~er$-e~y,~ni,~ncre:a:se ~11 ~he indus~tfial w~ge "rate ·leads 'tQ,a. t:~d~-c:tion in
,< ~'
pro:fit level~ < ~ecaus<e of ft;s aqve~s~ :~ffect on. r~ta'iIte>~ e~~+:t'!in~s:~
FrQm't~e,grain yield equation, 'it iippears that village lea-gers do try to
control grain yield by requiring farmers to pLant' a larger proportion of grain
area to hybrid rice. lncre-ases in fertilizer supply. are also important :1n
explaining grain yields. The magnitude of this coeff·icient has interesting
implications'for village policy. Using the mean values of the variap~es, the
- > ~ > ,
c()~~ficfen't ·itn~li~s." tt!:at t~ i-nf;reas'~ <the-~:value 'p£' gr.:;iin .production :by' 1060
yuan at the ~argin requires 2000 yuan of additional fe:r;-tilizer at curr:ent
prices. While thi.$ result ap,p:ears economically irratiob_al, it 1's: im-p:o;t;'tant to
remember that farme,rs are diverting some .of,the fert~lizer to crop~ othe~ than
gra~n" In' tni'$ sense the value of the fertilizer is unaere>stimated. The
empirical result, however, is also consistent with the status af£~tded vIllage
leaders whose Villages h~ve high gratn yields, and it also refiectsthe ';,
leaders' c~ncern for meeting grain quot,~~.
The sign, on the coefficient of the price variable is also positive,
although its standard errQr is $ome~h~t large relativa to ~he magnitude of the
coefficient'. The positive s'tgn in(hc~te~ that eVen when facing declining
20relative agl;"lculturalpric,es, villa,ge grain yields continue to rise.
Apparently, viliage leider!f h~~~ effedtlv~iy used adkt~istratlve"means to
encourag~"farmEir$ to' su~t.ain A.grlcultufal yields.
" The' ~ffect bn grain yleld~ 'df'lficreasing cash crop ·area is negati-ve. As
cash c1"&p area rlses, farmers are likely t~'allocate more time and current
Inputts'l:o ·tlie's:e; c'io:P~'t sln¢~ the§"'are reiati~~iy'm~~e ;;~iitable. However.
this drop is' mtn1lnal (a loss 6:f :les~ than 1 'j in-"O.S kg--of gr~in yield for
each 10 InU 'e'onverted 'to ~ash 'cropland) ') pe'rhaps' becaus:e far~ers are tacitly
al'lc;}~ea'e~· 'eultivat'~'a:dd{tiQiiaf C:8S'b. c;:rop ar·~a :~~ly o.ri t:he> coridi;i~n t.hat
't:he:ii' > ~~~'in: ytetd~' >te'tn~l·n 'r~ !~t:~v~-ly cons'tant. ,.
'.;A~' ex:p;e:Bt'~:a: 'tB:e'.'foan :vati~bie 'h:a~ :th;i::~~-s'texplan~t~ry--'p~~~r €)f any of
the variables in the industrial c.apital equation. The magnitude of the
coeffiel.Cant suggests that mo'st loans do gc> for new fixed inv-estment t a.nd that
they ottet1':act· asse-ed eapleaf. For each dollar" granted t'o' the village
~nterpriset leaders inve.st 1.38 dollars in new capital"plant. The coefficient
C;f the l:s:g:g~d.non.agri~ul~ural,lahcrr va.rt~~ie 1.5 .,also- pQ:~itj.ve a:s,.:'e.xpected f .
although'its magnitude- is ·small re-la·tlve t'~ the size o£ its standard error.
'Hypo'theses regarding the e:ffects of the rettlsining va,riables Qn the level
of capital were ambIguous ." The es:timate$ 'of their c.oeffic1ents help explain
the dete:rbIinant·s of increase 'to capftal pIa.nt. The pegative.signs OTt' the
lagged p:rofit and price variables could. arise in part due to the cap!tal
shortages witht'n the village economies'. These coefficients mean that when
profits and price's at'e high t 'th'~ capt'tal bas·e is lowered in the subs.e.quent
years. In an 'expanding ec¢nomy t retained earnings t'hat are produe'ed fro~
profitable years"are' not investe·dinto capital stock t bu·t are used as short~
term operating capital. Conversely, the signs of the coefficients mean that
21when profits and prl~es are, dO~'J f,i:r:~~ will beg~~ to ,bui~d 1:J.p tl:1eir,capital
bases. These actions by village, lel!ldersJ , wh~le, c~un1;:e17':' i.'D.tlJit~v~ in a
competitive economy J 8:r~ consistent with t;'Q-e go~l~ ,r~pl:'~.~ente~d by ~~e m~lti-
> ~ ,>: ~A ~ ~ , • " > > ( - ~ ~ ~ ~ ,. -
attribute objective,function. In4ustrial profits anq capital l~vel~.both
contribute to power t ~ersonal profi,t and incre~se,d ~nd~pen4:enc~e,from' ,townspip,
leaders. When prices are l~Wt ther:e is a negativ.~ ~~f~ct on t~ese goals
" ,
through the profit variable. ~ring ~es~ times, v~l~age lea,dars can
comp~:rt~~'!Z:e':by ,~ubstttuting irt'V:'H).tm~n't i>~, f,ix~d pla:n~, f9r,l-o~~:r p;rpfits,o the
, .,,"~:~ ~ './ I -. ~ / , >. .~. ,- ~ ,. ~ .'/ > > ~
longer-term capital projects.
In the non-agricultura,~ labor equat~on" all hut one of:.: th~ coeffi,.cients
have the expected ,Si,~S,> althou,gh ~~ sO:qle. ca~~~ th~, $.~<;lndar~ .~rt'9rs; ~re,.,~m9-1L.
relative to the.ir magni-tudes. The results confirm. the hY'P0~hes~s that J.ab9r
;> ~y > ~ - < >
sign ~n' the::,hybrld ,rice variable 'illus¥r~t~s th~ COnip-,~t1tiQn __for labor be,~w:een
labor·intensive agricultural technology>(i'~'t.~ybri~ rice) ~nd th~ non-f:~~m
;> l ,.., ~ ~ <
sector', The c;oeffi:cient i'mplie.s thi:it ,as vil~3:ge leaders ~9~ce, .f,armers to
increase hybri9 r~ce area the fl.ow of labor out of the agr.i~uItural, se~,t:0r is
reduced.
The results were mixed on the wa~e I price and obliga.tion Va,.f:i.~bles. .As
expected, rising prices in the ind:us~r~.~l secto; a~d l~wer .pg,ri~':lltural pri~~s
do appear to encourage labor ,~o m:o~e, o~t of the farm>~,1!~ secF~r ~ The pO$itive
,," i
coefficient on the obligation variable also means that the amount of labor
flowing to off-farm jobs will increase as officials force vill~ges to sell
more grain to the grain stations at below-market prices.
22The~e:g1ttt~~. c~~ffi~t~-nt on ~the::;;;W,.:ge 'Var;l.b:l~ ... in :th~ no:n-a~rl~~1-~t;1r~l
labor equa;ti.oi1, hc>weiter t ~-.~ unexp~~ted.. 'f:hls<~ari~ble.<:is l10t $'lgn$;jfie~nt<in
arty of the-.::s:truc:tural e~uat~o-~s. P~rt of the' .p-rob·~_e-m <inay' b~ in < the way ~hat
the wage v~ri~bl~,_wa$' cons:tru~-e~dt t~~ wage b'f~ll divided by the total- n~ber
of labor-d~y~. $~nc~ SOlD,~ f~'ctori~s '~ffer bo~us-es:.:ana hav~ pr~fit --~lj:~~tng
incentive _pl~ns that are considered :part of the wage bill. the <\a:ily'~ag~ for
s,oJn~ villa$e~ 1Jla~.,be ()v~~~tated. Likewise. the effo-:rt required :~y f~_ct_o;ries
" < , ,
in ~iffer~rit vilt~ga$ vaiies."greatlYf"these ~:~ffer~nc~s ar'e,- ·no:t accCiJIited .for.
.I~.•·.~lihija~aqu~t~()n, th~>~~ett:ic~;~t()ft~ii Ilt$it~,*~aQb~y~)"i~~le
$:~S*~$:ts '~~~i:'):h~ ,,~~low ~:f. :141)0,1;: ··~~:t "of ':~j~rnliT:Lg tri,< pi~~~i~~~;:.per16ds<"pii)~p:~;s:
Y$.1-:~ag~ l~:~d~J;·s,'·tQ _r'ed~~;~' t~e' re:1:~cl~'~ .~t:~-a' -t~·:hY:bi~,d tlee._ :~~nYe.r$:til~.~<t~~~n
A ~ > ~ ,~
theobli-gition variable and the indu~>triai' ..a&ricuitural prI'ce index i-n~rc!.as~t
the propot:~i,_~n of area planted ~:o'hybrid rice rise·s. While the coefficien~, on
<.
the price:vatlable might seem wrong f~r the profit maxinlizing agent t villa'se
l'~aders may rai-s:e the ar~a s~wn to hybrid: ri~:e eve~ when agri~u.ltu~a<l pric~s
a'~_~ '~~l~~g- relEft~,'\t~ 't~ tpe _:Ptip~<:Q:£' 'lndu's:~~i~l go:o:dS:.; ·fr(.m·: :~i$'c~~$to:ns' ~i.t:h
~ ~ < • " > , > < ~ ',< A( < ~ • ., ~ i • ~ " • ~ • >.~ >
Th~ positive $ign on ~his
--.
Ti;l:e C,?~~2i;'Ol.:Eq~at-;tQ~s: In thi:~ dyn~ic.- fr:ame,work, th.e c0:~t-rol .Efqy:at:ions
i-dentift the: £ee~bae:~ rel·at~_~nshi:p.s :~b:etwe:~n the level~ of :the l~gg~d state
variable:s arid the current control'-variables. --, As seen in equation (3)'J the
curre.nt..~:Qntirol variables are ·functions,of all of the lagged st~te v-ariabIes
from the:s:truetUral equations ~ The 'estlm·a-ted reg.u~:t~~'for these equations are





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































"The industrial output equat-ion s,ug-gests tha-t the levels of capital and
labor resources in the village ate important determinants of planning
industrial production in the village. There is also ,strong feedback between
loans in the previous year and current prodp.ction, a relationship that might
be expected in a capital·short ,economy_ Likewise, large profits in the
p+evious year appear to lead to expanded current output, although it is
diffie-ult to pla¢e much confidence ln this result'because the stand.ard error
of this coe_£fici,ent ~!; larg_e ,re~~tl"e to its nl'agnitude~ The coefficient on
erro-r :~~: $e~~s lik:elY ;that reso\;1rc:e -~\1allab-ili;t?-~:&s__ a~e mo~e < im:pot'-t:.ti:nt, than
relat~ve pr-i:c~s in fonn~ia:t:lng"burr-ent prG,~ud:tlo:n de¢isi:tsri:s-:.
The re,sults of the investment equation support the observations made
earlier regarding the capital equation: Loans and non·farm labor allow
village leaders to expand their local industries through new investment. The
f~adback between lagged capital and investment, however, is negative. The
$:i:i:~ of _ ~his c;oe~'t:leient 'is :eb~s-~-st,ent ~:~-th 'the ~b-s-e:rvat:ion-t:l1:at, .-without:,
loa.ns, major capftal investments could be made only after small am,ounts of
funds ha~ b~een acc\\UDulated over ~ per~od ~'f several yea:rs.
The results from the hybrid rice equation support the hypothesis that
village lead~rs strive to 1;I1a,ip:tai:h ag:r:icult~.u=al produc.tivity through -:the
adoption of a.gricultural technology, even under conp;itions that would
otherwise lead to reduced pro-ductio-n levels. In particul-ar. village leaders
appear to increase the propor-tion of land planted to hybrid rice even when
agricultural prices fa.l1 relative to those in the industrial sector ~ HJ:brid
rice area also rises along with profits in village industries and the size of
the marketing obligation. All three responses are consistent with the
25observa,tion that the yield incre~ses from new technology release land for




These results are reconfirmed by the signs on the
coefficients for the same variables in the cash crop equation t although the
level of confidence that can be placed on the magnitude of the coefficients is
lower.
M.ost o£ ,the coefficients in the fertil~zer supply equation are as
.ex'P~ct:ed. ' 1'h~ si.gn ()~ t~¢· coe.fficie!J;t :()f lagged nQn-agri:ctilt;ura~ l~bor
>. > > ~ , .
, ,
.·has l~ft ~gri~~I:tural pr:oductlo:n. In yea:rs following high level~ 'of
investment iil the industrial sector, less fertilizer is supplied for current
production. One possible explanation is that op~rating capital to purchase
fertilize,r is .i~ short su:pply. Ther.e also appears _to be a negative fe,edback
relationship between grain yields and fertilizer. Low yields in the previous
year p:t;':omp1: village lea.t;i~rs to incr~ase th~ availability of'-:fettilizer for
c~rrept>~:t::~d~~t)LOh.·
The problems in measuring the wage rate appear to have also affected the
results of the control equ~tipn for village w~;ge rates. The coefficients of
most lagged -$-ta:te vari~bles have large standard ~J:rors J ma~in~ it difficult to
pl-ac,e c6:nfiden~e in their signs or in their absolute magnitudes. Current
wages do appear to he higher in years following high industrial prices.
Summary Conclusions
In thi$ p-aper J a dynamic control framework is used to create an
integrated model of the village in China's reform economy_ Village leaders
are assumed to maximize a multi-attribute utility function subject to certain
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behavio'r of farmers. The theoretical mo4el is designed t~, ,assi~t,l?~JJSY-:
- , , - -~ >~ > -'~ --~~>' • ~ , >,> ~~,
makers in ana.l,y~ln~ the new relationships tqat exist bet~\uH~,n vil1-~ge, lead~rs.
, - -',- ~ -' - ,.~', - < > y ,<,
and farmers in rural a~eas. It is estimated empir~c~~ly tlS~T).g vl1~ag~ qata.
In the empirical s'Pecific.ation~,.:Village leade~~ 9:~~ ass~~d to ~C?hi~ye
their goals by selecting the levels of ~mpo~tant a$ricult~r~l ~~d inqus~r~a~
decision vari~bles o-ver which they have cont;,J701. Nine ~tru~~~ral eq~~ti~ns
- ~' l ' ," ~
are specifi:ed to, .de~~ril;>e the relatt.~>n$hip pe~een. the :,~g1;'.~cul~llr.~;l ~n~ l':l,Q>t:l-
agrl~ltutals~c$Drlt oithe village. 'rhec~~~ror~~~tio~~de r;va~f~!?m
within''thi$ tt:~~~\tli>;rk cap"tt;tre the. feedback r,elat,i;onships :~etween 'lag,$ed state
- ~ - = ~ -,
variables 'and, current var:.{able-s,under vills&e control.
In formulating the model, information collected during intensive
interviews with village leaders provide.d the basis for generating testable
hypotheses concerning important villa:ge objectives. In the empirical
analysis, estimates were obtained for the parameters of the structural and
cont:r.ol :e:quations.
< ~ > , , -
The empirical results generally support the hypotheses implicit in the
specification of the m.odel. It does 8p;pe_ar that village leaders are cQucerned
with a number of cO-inpeting objectives. The results are consistent with the
current pt:e:t»ccupat1.on wi.th indus·trialization in rural China. They are also
consistent 'With the observation that maintaining high agricultural
productivity enhances the status and promot19ual oppo-rtunities of village
leaders, while simultaneously reflecting concerns for meeting agricultural
grain obligations. Further evidence on the relative importance of thes-e
objectives will be forthcoming from on-going research designed to recover the
weights associated with the various objectives.
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The' ~mp;fricat'results ~re-' q~i-te encouraging particularly given the fact
that' e:corioln~ttic analysis'generally'has ha_~ a poor t'l;·ackrec.ord when applied
behavioral atnf'institutiorlal ~~s-umptions for these difficulties. The type of
modeI--used'1n this'paper accounts'f~r-some o.f th~ 'institutional and structural
fae-tar's-that affect 'decisiori' m~king in chi~a' s' mixed economy. This and
simili:h~- ·'iil'O·~~ts"$noufd 'be -cif tncr~'as'ingly greater intere~t to economists as the
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